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To apply contributory negligence to the seat belt fact pattern
emphatically demonstrates the conflicting arguments concerning the
doctrine. On the one hand, barring the plaintiff from recovery
solely because of the failure to use the belt, which contributes not
even an iota to the happening of the accident but may aggravate
the injury, amply corroborates those who scorn the harshness of
the contributory negligence rule. On the other hand, to travel
only half the course and allow recovery for only those injuries not
attributable to his conduct is to directly encounter the difficult
problems which the doctrine attempts to avoid, especially that of
apportionment.
As the question comes before the appellate court of each juris-
diction, an opportunity will be afforded to properly evaluate the
arguments concerning the defense of contributory negligence and
to make a decision for or against the encouragement of its con-
tinued existence. The court should carefully study the traditional
arguments for the defense and take proper cognizance of the trend
bringing about the decline of the doctrine and expanding the con-
cept of negligence to compensate the victims of a wrong. It is
submitted that if the proper balance is reached, this trend should
be given a needed stimulant by refusing to entertain evidence of a
plaintiff's failure to use an available seat belt. Such a holding
could be precedent for preventing the defense of contributory negli-
gence where plaintiff's alleged negligence is not a contributing
cause of the injury, but merely a contributor to its severity.
APPEALABILITY OF AN ORDER REVOKING PROBATION
Probation is a relatively recent development in criminal law.
It is the power, exercised in the discretion of the trial judge,'
to suspend the sentence of a criminal offender and release him
subject to the performance of certain conditions set forth by the
trial judge. Violation of any one of these conditions may be the
basis for revocation of the probation.
[T]he defendant has the right to retain his probation status as long
as he complies with the conditions attached thereto. Consequently
to justify revocation of the probation, it must be shown that without
excuse, he has committed such a breach of the conditions of the pro-
bation as justify its revocation. Otherwise stated, the revocation of
probation must be fairly made, it must not be arbitrary, and the action
of the court must be supported by reasonable grounds.2
'See, e.g., Comment, Probationer's Right to Appeal;, Appellant's Right
to Probation, 28 U. CHL L. REv. 751, 752 (1961).
S25 F. WHARTON, CRImINAL LAW. & PRocsnUIm §2194 (L Andersoh
ed. Supp. 1967).
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The standard condition most often employed is that the pro-
bationer behave lawfully during the period of probation. Such a
condition has been found to exist by implication when it was not
expressly stated by the trial judge.3  Indeed, a probationer can
be held to be in violation of such a condition even if he is
acquitted of the subsequent charge. Thus, where hearsay evidence
is not sufficient for conviction, it could be the basis for the
revocation.m4 On the other hand, the mere fact that a probationer
is held to have committed a crime does not preclude the conclu-
sion that he is a law-abiding citizen. For example, a member of
a political party was convicted and placed on probation for a
conspiracy to disturb the peace as a result of certain violent and
unauthorized means of protest. Subsequently, he was convicted
for the peaceful act of placing posters on private property in
violation of a much-neglected statute. Instead of finding a viola-
tion of his probation, the appellate court found that he did
precisely what was desired of him. That is, he had learned to
employ peaceful means of expressing political opinions instead of
violent ones.5
Other often employed conditions are those of restitution, fine
and imprisonment. The use of restitution as a condition is justi-
fied upon the theory that a criminal should bear the financial
burden for the damage resulting from his acts." Such payments
are often used to offset the civil damages for the same acts.7
With respect to fines and imprisonment as conditions of probation,
there is the danger that the mere appellation "condition of proba-
tion" might enable the court to circumvent the maximum punish-
ments set by law for the crimes involved. Thus, where the
maximum fine for the offense was $200, a probationer was required
by the trial judge to pay $1000 as a condition of his probation."
Although the states that allow imprisonment as a condition of
probation are few and the term usually is of short duration, there
is, nevertheless, the danger that the probationer may actually serve
a longer term than he would have had he not been placed on
probation.9 After serving his short term, he then may violate
one of his conditions and could thereby be resentenced to the
3 E.g., State v. Chestnut, 11 Utah 2d 142, 356 P.2d 36 (1960).
4 Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965).
5 Swan v. State, 200 Md. 420, 90 A.2d 690 (1952).
6See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 CoLum. L. REv.
181, 183 (1967).
7Id.
8 The appellate court apparently realized the danger and reduced the
fine. People v. Kuhlman, 86 Cal. App. 2d 566, 195 P.2d 53 (Dist. Ct
App. 1948).9 See Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 CoLum. L. Rr.
181, 184-85 (1967).
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maximum term. In such a case, the original probationary term,
together with the term resulting from revocation, results in incar-
ceration for a period greater than the maximum term for the
original crime.
Aside from these standard conditions, the trial court usually
has broad discretion to fashion the conditions to the particular
requirements of the individual defendant.' 0 For example, one
convicted for a narcotics violation may be required to be under
the care of a doctor."- Although other conditions which may be
imposed, such as restrictions on probationer's social and business
relationships, 2 can be repressive, the purpose of probation is never-
theless seen as a humanitarian one. Its principal focus is on the
rehabilitation of the criminal by returning him to society instead
of incarcerating him in the unhealthy atmosphere of a prison.
It is hoped that under the proper supervision he will be able to
readjust to society with the result that any further criminal
behavior will be deterred.' 3  In addition, it is recognized that
probation affords the state substantial economic benefits since, by
returning the offender to society, there is no need to support
either the prisoner or his family.'4
Historically, probation has been considered by some courts
to be an outgrowth of the inherent power of the courts to suspend
indefinitely either the imposition or the execution of sentence.
The difference between the two is that where imposition of sen-
tence is suspended, neither judgment nor sentence is ever entered,
whereas if execution is suspended, the criminal is actually sen-
tenced to a fixed term. The relevance of the distinction lies in
the trial judge's sentencing power after probation has been
revoked. Most statutes authorize the judge to sentence the crim-
inal to any term that could originally have been imposed where
imposition is suspended. 15 But, where execution is suspended, the
term imposed upon revocation is usually restricted to the original
term 16 or to a lesser term.'
7
10A strong plea has been made that these conditions bear a functional
relation to the particular situation so that the purposes of probation can be
implemented rather than frustrated. Note, Judicial Review of Probation
Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. Rzv. 181 (1967).
11 People v. Turner, 27 App. Div. 2d 141, 276 N.Y.S.2d 409 (4th Dep't
1967).
12Note, supra note 10, at 187.
132 U.S. DF'T OF JUsTIcE, ATTORNEY GERAI's SuRvzy OF RELasE
PROCEDURES 1 (1939) [hereinafter cited as SURVEY].
14 See, e.g., Sparks v. State, 40 Ala. App. 551, 119 So. 2d 596 (Ct. App.
1959), aff'd on other gromus, 270 Ala. 488, 119 So. 2d 600 (1960).
"SE.g., ARiz. R V. STAT. ANN. § 13-1657 (1956); CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 39-16-9 (1963); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.300 (1963).
E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-1657 (1956); CAr-. PEN. CODE
§ 1203.2; WASH. REv. CoDE § 9.95.220 (1951).
'1 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 54-114 (1958).
But see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §39-16-9 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT.
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The jurisdictions accepting the theory that there is an inherent
power in the courts to suspend sentences reason that such was
the power that existed in the common law of England. In the
much celebrated case of People ex rel. Forsyth v. Court of
Sessions,"8 the New York Court of Appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of the then newly enacted suspension statute against a
charge that the power infringed upon the executive 'power of
pardon. The Court, however, went further and pointed out that
the statute did not confer any new power, but was merely
declaratory of the common law. Not all jurisdictions, however,
accepted this reasoning. The most noteworthy rejection occurred
in the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte United States
(the Killitis case)*19 The Court held that, absent anr statute,
the federal courts had no power to suspend a sentence indefinitely.
Although it was true that, at common law, the English courts
had such power, it did not follow that the federal courts were
likewise empowered since the reasons for its existence no longer
held true. At common law, suspension of sentehce was resorted
to as a temporary device to correct errors or miscarriages of
justice which, under the modern federal and state systems, are
subject to correction by review and new trials. Moreover, such
power to refuse to enforce the punishment prescribed by the
legislature was seen to rest exclusively in the executive power of
pardon. Without attempting to weigh the validity of either ap-
proach, it is sufficient to note that the problem has been' laid to
rest by the passage, in most states, of legislation enabling the
courts either to suspend sentence or to suspend sentence and place
§9-2211 (1956); N.Y. CODE CRiM. PRoc. §§470(a), 483(4); N.Y. Pi, .
CoD. § 2188,. which provide that in either case the term. that could have
been imposed originally may be imposed upon revocation.
According to Mr. Sayler, the chief United States Probation Officer
for the Southern District of New York, the motivation behind the choice
between suspension of imposition and execution often backfires. Impelled
by the desire to give a strong warning to a criminpl, the judge will often
impose a sentence and then suspend it. Thus, it is hoped, that the recogni-
tion of that from which he is being saved will be more clearly present
in the probationer's mind and will more effectively work, as, a. deterrent
against, violation. But, if in so doing, the judge does not impose the
maximum term, the judge in charge of the resentencing is often hand-
cuffed if he feels that the probationer should get a longer term. The
result is, then, that the probationer is given a light sentence where,
in the first place, the judge felt compelled to utter harsher warnings.
(Information obtained from a telephone conversation with this researcher.)
15 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386 (1894). See also State v. Bucldey, 75
N.H; 402, 74 A. 875 (1909); Philpots v. State, 65. N.H. 250, 20 A. 955(1890); State ex rel.' Gehrmann v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430, 82 A. 424
(1911); Commonwealth ex rel. Nuber v. Keeper,'6 Pa. Super. 420 •(1898).
19242 U.S. 27 (1916). See also Brabandt v. Commonwealth, 157 Ky.
130, 162 S.W. 786 (1914); Spencer v. State, 125 Tenn. 64, 140 S.W. 597(1911),-,
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the criminal on probation. 20 Even those courts which found an
absence of an inherent power to suspend sentence upheld these
statutes generally on the theory that the legislature has broad
powers to set the punishment for the crime.
21
At this point, some reference should be made to other forms
of conditional release with which probation is often confused. As
should be noted from the foregoing discussion, pardon is an
executive function,22 whereas probation is a judicial function.
Another difference between the two is that pardon may be granted
before or after sentence has begun, while probation is granted by
the trial judge before service of sentence has commenced. Finally,
a pardon may be granted unconditionally, i.e., unlike the person
on probation, the pardoned individual may become a free member
of society without any fear of further liability.
Parole is the procedure most often confused with probation.23
The basic difference is that parole is an administrative function per-
formed by a parole board. These administrators, not the courts,
decide whether a convict will be conditionally released. Second,
parole usually occurs after one has already served a portion of his
term. Probation occurs by the exercise of the discretion of the trial
judge who feels that the criminal will be best rehabilitated without
undergoing imprisonment. In other words, in most situations,
probation precludes incarceration, assuming of course, that no
conditions are violated.2 4  Suspension of sentence is the last
method to be confused with probation. Here, the difference is
primarily that a suspension merely provides relief from incarcera-
tion without providing for any express conditions on which the
continuation of the relief depends.
25
Constitutional Protection and Probation
Despite the considerable growth of probation through legisla-
tion, the courts have generally maintained a restrictive attitude
with respect to the probationer's procedural rights. One of the
theories that has effectively contributed to this approach is the
"act of grace" theory. Its inception dates back to the case of
Escoe v. Zerbst,26 wherein the United States Supreme Court
established that, since probation exists as a matter of grace, there
2 0 See generally 2 SURVEy 3-10.
21Id. at 14. See Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 52 (1916);
State v. Abbot, 87 S.C. 466, 470, 70 S.E. 6, 8 (1910).
222 SURvEY 2-3.
23 2 SuRvEY 2.
24 It is also assumed that imprisonment is not considered to be a proper
condition for probation.
26See Cooper v. State, 175 Miss. 718, 168 So. 53 (1936).
26295 U.S. 490 (1935).
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was no constitutional requirement that the probationer be afforded
an opportunity to be heard before his probation was revoked.
The Court stated:
In thus holding we do not accept the petitioner's contention that the
privilege [opportunity to be heard] has a basis in the Constitution,
apart from any statute. Probation or suspension of sentence comes
as an act of grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled
with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may
impose.2
7
Nevertheless, the Court found that the language contained in the
statute to the effect that the defendant is "to be arrested and
brought before the court" mandated a hearing.
Many states have agreed with the Court that a hearing is not
constitutionally required.2 8  In construing a California statute
which provided that the probationer "may" be taken before the
court, the Supreme Court of California, in In re Davis,29 applied
the reasoning of Escoe, but then went even further by submitting
that the administration of justice was better served by permitting
ex parte revocations. Otherwise, a probationer who was imprisoned
out of state or avoided arrest or service of notice until his proba-
tion period expired, could pass beyond the court's jurisdiction
to impose sentence or execute the suspended one even though he
proved himself unfit for probation.
Although the privilege-right conceptualizing embodied in the
"act of grace" theory has proved sufficient, still another theory has
been employed to restrict a probationer's procedural rights. Under
the "contract theory," "the violation of the terms of probation
is not a crime necessarily, and is not treated as a crime, but is
rather in the nature of a breach of contract." 30 By accepting
probation, the probationer agrees to abide by the conditions set
down for him as well as the procedures employed in implementing
the probation. In effect, by agreeing to probation, he waives
any rights that he might have had to procedural due process and
in its stead accepts whatever procedure is currently in force.
Even if a hearing is granted, claims that one is entitled to
counsel, a trial by jury, or the right to confront witnesses, have
271d. at 492-93.28 E.g., Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146 (1898) (executive parole);
Johnson v. Walls, 185 Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937) (parole); Pagano
v. Bechly, 211 Iowa 1294, 232 N.W. 798 (1930) (suspended sentence);
Ex parte Kuney, 168 Misc. 285, 5 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd
without opinion, People ex rel. Kuney v. Adams, 256 App. Div. 802, 9
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1st Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 280 N.Y. 794, 21 N.E.2d 621
(1939) (suspended sentence).
2937 Cal. 2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951).
39People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 396, 138 N.W. 1044, 1047 (1912).
See also In re Young, 121 Cal. App. 711, 10 P.2d 154 (1932).
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generally been confronted with similarly restrictive reasoning. 31
Apart from the act of grace and contract theories, the courts
have, in addition, reasoned that these procedural rights do not
apply to a revocation proceeding because it is not a criminal
prosecution. In People v. Dudley,3 2 the probationer alleged that
the failure of the statute to provide for trial by jury, right to
confront witnesses or the right to counsel rendered the statute
unconstitutional. It was held, however, that these constitutional
provisions did not apply since such a proceeding was not a crim-
inal prosecution. In so holding, the court brought in the contract
theory to reach its conclusion, viz., a violation of a condition
of probation is not a crime, but rather a breach of contract.
It should be noted, however, that many statutes provide for
the procedural rights discussed above 3 3 and, in addition, there is
some authority that such rights are, in fact, constitutionally re-
quired.34  The reasoning in such cases finding that due process is
applicable has rested basically on the theory that even though
probation is a matter of grace and the liberty is conditional, the
probationer has a vested right in his liberty that may not be
denied without due process. As one court recently stated, a
probationer is "relieved of the ignominy of imprisonment, and
may continue to support himself and his family. Clearly substantial
interests accompany a probationer's status." 3 Recent law review
articles have also argued that the traditional distinction between
privilege and right should no longer apply.36 Analogies have
been made to the United States Supreme Court cases which
have seriously impaired the validity of the doctrine of privilege
31E.g., People v. Dudley, 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912).
32 173 Mich. 389, 138 N.W. 1044 (1912). See also United States v.
Hollien, 105 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mich. 1952).
33Right to a hearing: e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 42, § 24 (1958); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §2A:168-4 (1951); N.Y. CODE Cam. P oc. § 935. Right to counsel:
e.g., ALAsxA STAT. § 12.55.110 (Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.06(1944).
34 Right to a hearing: e.g., Fleenor v. Hammond, 116 F.2d 982 (6th Cir.
1941); Lester v. Foster, 207 Ga. 596, 63 S.E.2d 402 (1951); State v.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 P. 1044 (1927). Right to counsel: e.g.,
People v. Valle, 7 Misc. 2d 125, 164 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Ct Spec. Sess. 1957);
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945). Right to cross-
examine: e.g., Robinson v. State, 62 Ga. App. 539, 8 S.E.2d 698 (1940);
People v. Oskroba, 305 N.Y. 113, 111 N.E.2d 235 (1953) (by implication).
35 Sparks v. State, 40 Ala. App. 551, 554, 119 So. 2d 596, 598 (Ct. App.
1959), aff'd on other grounds, 270 Ala. 488, 119 So. 2d 600 (1960).
36 See, e.g., Hink, The Application of Constitutional Standards of Protec-
tion to Probation, 29 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 483, 493 (1962); Note, Judicial
Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 181, 190 (1967);
Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLum. L. Rav. 311,
326 (1959).
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in the areas of public employment and admission to the bar."'
If there is a vested right in public employment and admission to
the bar, should there not be such a right to remain on probation?
A revocation of probation involves a question of fact as to whether
a condition was violated. Since the procedural rights in question
are designed to assure the reliability of such a fact-finding process,",
why should these procedural rights be denied to one contesting
a charge that he is in violation of such conditions, which charge,
if upheld, would result in his imprisonment?
With respect to the contract theory, the arguments made
in its support seem likewise unconvincing. To say that there is
any real choice between imprisonment and the relative freedom
of probation -is an absurdity. The better view would seem to be
that in light of the coercive reality of a probation "offer" there
is no likeness to a contract.3 9
Although questions still exist as to the procedural due process
rights of a probationer, it would seem that substantive due process
is clearly distinguished from its procedural counterpart and is
generally found to be required in revoking probation. 40 Regard-
less of the procedure employed, a finding that there was a violation
of a probation condition cannot be based upon mere whim or
caprice. The foundation case for this principle is Burns v. United
States,41 decided by the Supreme Court just three years prior to
Escoe. In Burns, the petitioner had been serving one sentence
and was on probation for another, the terms of which provided
that he conduct himself as a law-abiding citizen. While in jail,
the petitioner was periodically permitted to visit his dentist. But
he often abused the privilege and, consequently, had his probation
revoked. The issue as framed by the Supreme Court was whether
the trial judge abused his discretion in implying as a condition
of his probation that the probationer should not commit acts
inconsistent with obedience to his sentence. In so framing the
question, the Court rejected the contention that the summary
nature or the informal procedural aspects of the hearing were at
all relevant on review. As the Court stated:
The question is simply whether there has been an abuse of discretion,
and is to be determined in accordance with familiar principles govern-
3 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Slochower
v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952).
us Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1966).
39 See, Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLum. L. Rnv.
311, 324 (1959).40See, e.g., Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 208 A.2d 575 (1965); Annot.,
29 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953); Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Con-
ditional Liberty, 12 WAYNE L. Rv. 638, 650-55 (1966).41287 U.S. 216 (1932).
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ing the exercise of judicial discretion. . . . While probation is a
matter of grace, the probationer is entitled to fair treatment, and is
not to be made the victim of whim or caprice. 42
Nevertheless, the Court held that there was no abuse of discretion.
At this point, it is of value to consider what the "discretion"
of the trial judge can involve. The trial judge can be said to
have discretion in choosing the conditions of probation, in deciding
whether the evidence supports a factual determination that the
conditions were breached, and in deciding whether the alleged
acts of the probationer, if true, are sufficient to justify a revoca-
tion of the probation. These questions of abuse of discretion and
substantive due process seem particularly amenable to the appellate
process. Such a determination rests on a review of the particular
situation. In the procedural area, once it is established that
there is such a constitutional right, there is in essence no issue
left to be resolved other than whether the constitutional mandate
is being obeyed. However, with respect to the kind of situation
to which Burns was addressed, the availability of an appeal serves
an important policing function. The trial judge is put on notice
that his exercise of discretion will be reviewed, thus assuring as
judicious a disposition as possible. Whether or not such an
appeal will lie is the subject of the remainder of this note.
RevLewability in General
It is well established that an appeal does not exist as a matter
of right.4 3  It is a matter of statutory grant and, therefore, it is
not a denial of due process not to allow an appeal. Whether
an appeal will lie is, therefore, determined by considering the
appropriate statutes. In New York, for example, the Code of
Criminal Procedure, Section 517, which provides the defendant
with an appeal as of right "from a judgment on a conviction in
a criminal action or proceeding . . . " is construed very strictly.
In People v. Gersewitz,4 4 it was held that an order denying a
motion to vacate the conviction, since not expressly provided for
in the statute, was not appealable. In reaching its conclusion,
the Court indicated that such omission might be inadvertent, but,
nevertheless, "the court has no power to supply even an inadvertent
omission of the Legislature." 45 It should be noted that this
omission was later rectified by the legislature." Although con-
struction is admittedly strict, it does not follow that absolutely
42 Id. at 222-23.
4 3 E.g., People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427, petition for
cert. dismissed, 326 U.S. 687 (1945).
44Id.
4G Id. at 169, 61 N.E.d at 430.
40 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1947, cl. 706, § 1.
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no flexibility is allowed. Section 518, concerning the right of the
state to appeal, provides that an appeal will lie "from a judgment
of the defendant, on a demurrer to the indictment." In People
v. Rossi,47 the defendant contended that the statute could not be
applied to a demurrer to a single count of an indictment contain-
ing nineteen counts, because it was not a "demurrer to the indict-
ment." This contention was rejected as too strict. First, there
was no meaningful distinction between stating the charges in
separate counts or in one indictment, since each separate count
could have been a separate indictment. Second, the use of the
word "judgment" instead of "order" in the statute was not of
significance since the allowance of a demurrer to one count finally
disposes of that charge. Moreover, it would be awkward if the
dismissal of one count could not be immediately reviewed, but
had to await the judgment of conviction. The New York Court
of Appeals refused to impute to the legislature an intent to create
such a situation.
Another example of the strict construction of appeal statutes
is the Illinois case of People v. Kuduk.48  The Illinois Probation
Act conferred jurisdiction on the lower appellate courts on appeal
or by writ of error of orders modifying or terminating the proba-
tion period. The statute provided that "[t]he appellate courts of
this State are hereby given jurisdiction finally to hear and deter-
mine all such appeals and writs of error." 49 The court held that
since an appeal was purely statutory, the statute precluded the
Supreme Court of Illinois from reviewing a decision of the
appellate court.
In the federal courts, it seems that there is a more liberal
attitude in allowing appeals.50 The courts of appeals are given
jurisdiction on appeals from "all final decisions." 51 This broad
statutory language has accordingly not been given a narrow or
technical construction. 52  A "final" decision is not necessarily the
last possible order to be made in a case,5" but
[i]n criminal cases, as well as civil, the judgment is final for the
purpose of appeal 'when it terminates the litigation . . . on the merits'
and 'leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what
has been determined.' 54
47 5 N.Y2d 396, 157 N.E.2d 859, 185 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1959).
48 388 Ii. 248, 57 N.E.2d 755 (1944).
4 9 IL.. Rsv. STAT. ch. 38, § 798 (1943).50 United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.), petition for cert.
dismissed, 323 U.S. 806 (1944).5128 U.S.C. § 1291 (1964).
52 Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966); United
States v. Cefaratti, 202 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
907 (1953).
53 Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964).
54 Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212-13 (1937).
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Under such a definition, the courts are concerned about the
finality of the disposition, not the technicality of the terms. Thus,
an order of probation whether before5 5 or after r6 imposition of
sentence has been considered final because, in realistic terms, it
finally determined the fate of the defendant. There was no
question as to his guilt and the only thing left was his imminent
imprisonment. Recently, it seems the courts have become even
more liberal in determining the finality of a decision, even though
the legislative intent seems to be to do away with piecemeal
appeals.5 7  In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 8 the plaintiff
sought recovery for negligence both under the Jones Act and local
state statutes. The trial court upheld a motion to strike all
complaints other than those based on the Jones Act. The Supreme
Court, admitting that such an appeal might be considered piece-
meal, nevertheless allowed the appeal in order to save the costs
that would result from a delay. Similarly, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recently allowed an appeal from the denial
of a motion to substitute parties, which was admittedly not tech-
nically final, in order to avoid time-consuming and unnecessarily
costly procedures.5 9
Review as the Proper Method of Appeal
Whether or not an appeal is liberally or strictly afforded, it
appears to be the proper medium in most jurisdictions to review
a contention that discretion was abused. One writer has stated
that habeas corpus is a basic means of reviewing revocation pro-
ceedings.60 It is, however, submitted that the scope is more limited
with respect to habeas corpus as compared to an appeal.6 ' It was
expressly stated in Escoe that the proper review of alleged errors
in conducting a revocation proceeding is by appeal, not by habeas
corpus 6 2 Historically, habeas corpus lies to review a claim that
the petitioner is being illegally detained under a void order, or an
order in which the issuing court had no jurisdiction over the
petitioner.6 3  Thus, habeas corpus is the proper remedy to review
55Korematzu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432 (1943).5OBerman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937).
57 National Brake & lec. Co. v. Christensen, 253 F. 880, 882 (7th Cir.
1919), rev'd on other grounds, 254 U.S. 425 (1921).
5sGillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
59 Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966).
60 See, e.g., Comment, Due Process and Revocation of Cmditional Liberty,
12 WAYNE L. REv. 638, 651 n.119 (1966).
61 See, e.g., Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLou. L.
REv. 311, 333 (1959).
62295 U.S. 490, 494 (1935).63 E.g., Comment, Post Conviction Remedies, 46 NEB. L. R v. 135, 137
(1967).
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a revocation order issued without a hearing when a hearing is re-
quired.64  Although it is true that the traditional limitation of
habeas corpus, confining it to issues of whether the court has ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction or whether it has issued a void order, has
undergone subtle changes so as to enable the petitioner to attack
violations of procedural due process, 5 it nevertheless appears that
it is still limited to attacks based on the allegation that the con-
finement is unconstitutional." An appeal is generally considered
the proper remedy for claims that discretion was abused. 7 In Ex
parte Kuney,* s it was held that even a gross abuse of discretion
is not necessarily an excess of jurisdiction that will justify a writ
of habeas corpus. It is, therefore, possible that even if an appeal
is not allowed, habeas corpus will still be unavailable for review of
an abuse of discretion. Since the term discretion is highly flexible,
it follows that there can be no fixed meaning for abuse of .dis-
cretion.6 19 Abuse of discretion does not necessarily mean only bad
faith, ulterior motive, or arbitrary conduct, but can be an erroneous
conclusion clearly against the logic and effect of the facts before
the court."0 If it can be shown that the action taken was arbi-
trary and capricious, some jurisdictions allow review by habeas
corpus. 71 But where the abuse lies in a misapplication of facts, it
would appear that the proper remedy is by appeal.7 2
Since the power to revoke is broad, the scope of the appeal is
somewhat limited, especially in comparison to an appeal of a con-
viction of a crime.73 In Manning v. United States, it was stated
as the following:
64 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 494 (1935).
65 People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257, 220 NE2d 653, 273
N.Y.S.2d 897 (1966). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963).
66 See Comment, Post Conviction Remedies, 46 NEB. L. REv. 135, 140(1967).67E.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216 (1932); Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 792 (1947).
68 168 Misc. 285, 5 N.Y.S.2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1938), aff'd without opinion,
People ex rel. Kuney v. Adams, 256 App. Div. 802, 9 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1st
Dep't), aff'd without opinion, 280 N.Y. 794, 21 N.E.2d 621 (1939).
69 See Kittrell v. State, 201 Miss. 514, 29 So. 2d 313 (1947).
7 0Adams v. Adams, 117 Ind. App. 335, 69 N.E.2d 632 (App. Ct 1946);
State v. Virgi, 84 Ohio App. 15, 181 N.E.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1948).
7'See In re Davis, 37 Cal. 2d 872, 236 P.2d 579 (1951); McDonough
v. Goodcell, 13 Cal. 2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035 (1939); Johnson v. Walls, 185
Ga. 177, 194 S.E. 380 (1937).
72 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Burns v. United States, 287
U.S. 216 (1932).
73Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLum. L. REv.
311, 333 (1959). See Manning v. United States, 161 F.2d 827 (5th Cir.
1947) ; Swan v. State, 200 Md. 420, 90 A.2d 690 (1952).
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A judge in such proceeding need not have evidence that would estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt guilt of criminal offenses. All that
is required is that the evidence and facts be such as to reasonably
satisfy the judge that the conduct of the probationer has not been
as good as required by the condition of probation.
7 4
Although the review is admittedly limited, its mere existence, as
stated above, tends to insure the proper exercise of discretion.
The trial court should enumerate its reasons for the revocation
and the appellate court is enabled to review the record.
7 5
Jurisdictions Denying Appeal
Most jurisdictions do allow a probationer to take an appeal
from an order revoking probation. Unfortunately, the reasons for
the allowance of such an appeal are not clearly enumerated. It
would appear that the underlying reason is to enable an abuse of
discretion to be rectified.7e In some jurisdictions such a right is
expressly provided by statute.7 7  There are, however, some juris-
dictions where the appeal is explicitly not allowed or the situation
is so confused that one cannot readily conclude when an appeal
will lie.
In Cooper v. State,78 a case involving a suspended sentence
without probation, it was argued that an appeal was purely statu-
tory. The statute provided for an appeal from a conviction, except
in the case where the defendant pleaded guilty. Therefore, the
statute in two ways precluded an appeal in that case. The first
was that the defendant had pleaded guilty and the second was
that revocation is not a conviction. Moreover, the court pointed
out that probation is a matter of grace and solely within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge. That being the situation, the court
accordingly would not allow an appeal unless the statute expressly
so provided. Although the result is justified by the express pro-
vision which disallows appeals on a plea of guilty, it would have
been illuminating had the court discussed more expansively why
"conviction" does not include an order occurring after the defendant
has already been found guilty, the effect of which is to place the
defendant in the exact same position as he would have been had
sentence been executed immediately after conviction.
74161 F2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1947).
75 See People v. Sims, 32 Ill. 2d 591, 208 N.E.2d 569 (1965).
76 Sparks v. State, 40 Ala. App. 551, 119 So. 2d 596 (Ct. App. 1959),
aff'd on other grounds, 270 Ala. 488, 119 So. 2d 600 (1960).
77 ILL. ANN. STATr. ch. 38, § 117-3(e) (Smith-Hurd 1964); TENN. CoDE
ANN. §40-2907 (1955); TEx. CODE CFal. PROC. art. 42.12, §8 (1966).
78 175 Miss. 178, 168 So. 53 (1936). Accord, Kittrell v. State, 201 Miss.
514, 29 So. 2d 313 (1947).
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A more complex situation occurs in those jurisdictions which
allow an appeal for a revocation of probation depending upon
whether the execution or the imposition of sentence was suspended.
The distinction rests on the theory that where the imposition of
sentence is suspended, there is no final judgment to appeal. 9 For
example, the California Penal Code, Section 1237, provides that
a defendant may appeal as follows:
1. From a final judgment of conviction; an order granting probation
shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of this
-section. . . .
3. From any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial
rights of the party.
In People v. Robinson,0 the Supreme Court of California, adher-
ing to the "general rule," held that an order revoking probation
before the entry of judgment was not an appealable order.8 ' The
court considered the order as intermediate, reviewable only on ap-
peal from the final judgment. In People v. Martin,82 another Cali-
fornia case, such an order made after entry of judgment was appeal-
able. This conceptual distinction has a certain symmetrical attrac-
tion, if no other. However, the problem then arose: what happens
if upon revoking probation, the court does not sentence the pro-
bationer, but only modifies the terms of probation? Can there be
an appeal from such an order? In re Bine,s3 doing some disserv-
ice to the symmetry as expressed, held that such an order is an
order made after judgment and is appealable. Thus, by this cir-
cuitous route, California has seemingly allowed an appeal from a
revocation, whether on review of the final judgment or by itself.
The purpose of the distinction between imposition and execu-
tion seems to have been intended to effectuate different sentencing
powers of the trial judge upon revocation. 4  Its relevance to the
appealability issue seems remote. The probationer, in either event,
stands convicted of the crime and subject to punishment, and there
is nothing further to be litigated. In fact, this distinction was
considered to be "one of trifling degree" by the United States Su-
preme Court in holding that an order placing one on probation,
79See Annot., 126 A.L.R. 1210 (1940).
3043 Cal. 2d 143, 271 P.2d 872 (1954).
81Accord, State v. Sharp, 138 La. 656, 70 So. 573 (1916) ; State v. Elder,
77 S.D. 540, 95 N.W.2d 592 (1959); State v. Farmer, 39 Wash. 2d 675,
237 P.2d 734 (1951).
32 58 Cal. App. 2d 677, 137 P.2d 468 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943).
8347 Cal. 2d 814, 306 P.2d 445 (1957).
84 See text relating to notes 15-17, s=Pra; Hink, The Application of
Constitutional Standards of Protection to Revocation, 29 U. CH. L. REv.
483, 494-95 (1962) ; Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 CoLut.
L. REv. 311, 320-21 (1959).
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without imposing sentence was a final decision from which an
appeal would lie. s Such recognition by the Supreme Court makes
for a strong argument that the proper concern is the probationer,
not mere conceptualization. If the probationer is effectively im-
prisoned, it would seem that he should be allowed an appeal from
the decision which results in his imprisonment.
In a relatively recent lower court opinion in Alabama, the
problem as to the appealability of revocation was dealt with ex-
tensively.8 6 Although the case dealt with a suspension of execu-
tion, its reasoning was sufficiently broad to come within the more
desirable and more realistic approach. A final judgment was seen
in practical and simple terms as "one which puts an end to the
proceedings between the parties to a cause in that court, and leaves
nothing further to be done." 87
New York's Situation
At this time, the New York law concerning the appealability
of an order of revocation is in conflict. Until recently, the appel-
late division departments that have spoken have, in memorandum
decisions, denied that such an appeal lies. s The extent of the
reasoning is a terse statement that appeal is by statute only, citing
New York Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 517. The pre-
sumption is that since section 517 makes no express mention of
an appeal from such an order, none can lie. The fourth depart-
ment has, however, recently overruled itself.8 9 An examination
of the facts of this case will reveal why the court felt compelled to
overturn the law. Appellant, a Negro and a drug addict, was sen-
tenced on his plea of guilty to a charge of attempting to sell nar-
cotics. He was placed on indefinite probation on the following
condition: "To immediately go to the Buffalo State Hospital and
be under the care of Dr. Burnett."90  However, appellant signed
himself out of the hospital after remaining there for a short period
and then reported to probation supervision. He was there reinstruct-
ed and told to get a job and to continue living at home. A report
filed by the probation department acknowledged that the appellant
sr0Korematsu v. United States, 319 U.S. 432, 435 (1943).
s Sparks v. State, 40 Ala. App. 551, 119 So. 2d 596 (Ct App. 1959),
aff'd on other grounds, 270 Ala. 488, 119 So. 2d 600 (1960).8 Id. at 554, 119 So. 2d at 599.
88 People v. Riley, 25 App. Div. 2d 915, 270 N.Y.S.2d 11 (3d Dep't
1966); People v. Terry, 21 App. Div. 2d 971, 252 N.Y.S.2d 703 (3d Dep't
1964); People v. Cocca, 13 App. Div. 2d 580, 211 N.Y.S.2d 722 (3d Dep't
1961); People v. Capria, 278 App. Div. 745, 103 N.Y.S.2d 358 (4th Dep't
1951).
8s People v. Turner, 27 App. Div. 2d 141, 276 N.Y.S.2d 409 (4th Dep't
1967).Old. at 143, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
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had maintained a good record and mature attitude. Subsequently,
however, the parents of a white girl swore out an affidavit to the
effect that appellant had been seen often with their daughter and
had been introducing her to narcotics. On the same day that the
affidavit was submitted, a probation officer swore to an information
that leaving the hospital without permission was a violation of the
probation. The officer admitted, however, on cross-examination,
that the condition as interpreted by him was ambiguous and the
defendant could have left the hospital without intending to violate
his condition. Probation was, nevertheless, revoked. Since it was
not clear whether the revocation occurred because the judge was
indisposed, toward interracial relationships or whether the condition
was actually violated, the appellate court held that the revocation
was not a sound exercise of discretion.
In essence, the opinion states that since revocation of a pro-
bation order is a quasi-criminal proceeding, the defendant
is entitled to appellate review to make certain that he was accorded
those rights that constitute due process and that the trial court
exercised a proper discretion in revoking probation ...
[I]t . . . [has been said] that '"Our law considers it an essential
right of a suitor to have his cause examined in tribunals superior to
those in which he considers himself aggrieved. . . ." So valuable a
right should not be declared forfeited except in the clearest of cases'
(citation omitted). 91
The quotation above apparently represents an attempt to answer
the well-established case law that an appeal is statutory only. 2
The soundness of the attempt is questionable. The court did not
squarely confront the contention that such an appeal will only be
allowed if expressly provided for by the statute.
It is submitted that there is a possible argument that can be
made to justify the result reached by the fourth department. The
reasoning suggested would have the term "judgment on a convic-
tion," as stated in Section 517 of the New York Code of Criminal
Procedure, include a revocation of probation. It is true that judg-
ment on a conviction has a well-defined technical meaning. It
refers not just to the plea or verdict of guilty, but also to the
entry of judgment or sentence.93 A similar parallel was attempted
to be drawn in Texas.94 The argument was there made by the
probationer that uncorroborated testimony in a revocation hearing
91 Id.
92 People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427, petition for cert.
disnissed, 326 U.S. 687 (1945).
93 Commonwealth v. Palerino, 168 Pa. Super. 152, 156, 77 A.2d 665,
667 (1951).
94 McDonald v. State, 393 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Dunn
v. State, 159 Tex. Crim. 520, 265 S.W.2d 589 (1954).
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was not admissible pursuant to statutory language to the effect
that a "conviction" cannot be had upon such testimony. The con-
tention was rejected on the ground that a revocation of probation
is not a conviction, but "a finding upon which the trial court may
exercise his discretion by revoking or continuing the probation."95
The reasoning seems conclusory at best. In any event, whether
an appeal will lie is an issue different from whether the testimony
was uncorroborated. An appeal goes to the foundation of the
probationer's rights since it is the medium by which he can claim
that he has been afforded improper treatment. Without the pos-
sibility of an appeal, the substantive question of whether the
testimony was uncorroborated could never arise. An appeal, there-
fore, should properly be considered in a more liberal light. While it
is true that, technically, a revocation is not a conviction, for all
intents and purposes they are the same. The probationer's guilt
is finally determined and he awaits only the impending incarcera-
tion. What reason, other than mere conceptualization, is there to
conclude that the two are different? The better view would seem
to be to construe the statute liberally and dispel such technicalities
when a man's liberty is at stake.
Conclusion
Although met by judicial setbacks along the way, probation
has progressed to a point where it has become commonplace in
our criminal jurisprudence. It is representative of a humane at-
tempt to understand and rehabilitate the criminal rather than punish
him. One offered an opportunity for probation would welcome
its grant. Content, therefore, with the court's light disposition, the
probationer is unlikely to appeal from the judgment, assuming that
a meritorious ground for appeal exists. If, while on probation, the
probationer commits certain acts which the court deems to be vio-
lations of his probation, the probationer now finds himself awaiting
the imprisonment of which he was previously relieved. If at this
point the statute of limitations has run,96 and the probationer is
not allowed an appeal of the finding that he has violated his pro-
bation, he is virtually without any appellate remedy for his im-
pending incarceration. Such a situation is not only immensely un-
fair to the probationer, especially since the conditions of the pro-
bation are not usually drawn with exactitude, but it also could
prove unworkable since it essentially gives the trial judge a free
reign. The discretion is broad, but it should not go unchecked.
95 McDonald v. State, 393 S.W.Zd 914, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).96See People v. Ector, 231 Cal. App. 2d 619, 42 Cal. Rptr. 388 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965); People v. Booth, 210 Cal. App. 2d 443, 26 Cal. Rptr. 717
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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Courts in the past have construed away technicalities in the
interest of attaining the practical ends of justice. 7  The courts
today that hold that no appeal lies from a revocation would do better
to re-examine their reasoning. Without an appeal, the humanitar-
ian goals sought to be achieved could very well go unfulfilled.
M
RES IPSA LOQUITUR: THE EXTENT TO WHICH PLAINTIFF MAY
ESTABLISH NEGLIGENCE
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, while appearing simple on
its face, is one of the more obscure doctrines to be found in the
negligence area. Perhaps the most difficult problem inherent in
this doctrine is, as has been pointed out in the recent New York
appellate division decision of Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc.,
whether or not res ipsa loquitur should be applied where a plaintiff
has proved specific acts of negligence. It is the purpose of this
note to analyze the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in general, with
specific emphasis being placed upon the questions that arise as to
the availability of res ipsa loquitur where a plaintiff has proved
or attempted to prove specific acts of negligence committed by the
defendant.
Res ipsa loquitur has been defined as "a common-sense ap-
praisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence,"' 2 or as "a
formulation of a species of circumstantial evidence."3  The working
definition offered here is that res ipsa loquitur is a procedural device
whereby the plaintiff need not factually establish a prima facie case
of negligence, an inference of negligence being logically deduced
from the neutral circumstantial evidence introduced. The doctrine
was first introduced into Anglo-American law in 1863 in the English
case of Byrne v. Boadle.4  In that case, plaintiff was injured when
he was struck by a barrel of flour which fell from the window of
defendant's store. Even though he failed to factually prove negli-
gence or an intentional tort, plaintiff nevertheless was successful in
his suit.
97 See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964);
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966); People v. Rossi,
5 N.Y.2d 396, 157 N.E.2d 859, 185 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1959) and text accom-
panying notes 47, 58, and 59 supra.
126 App. Div. 2d 155, 271 N.Y.S2d 866 (1st Dep't 1966).
2 Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N.Y. 230, 234, 196 N.E. 36, 38 (1935).
a Zaninovich v. American Airlines, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 155, 157, 271
N.Y.S.2d 866, 869 (1st Dep't 1966).
4 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863). See Bulman, Res Ipsa Loquitur-
When Does It Apply?, 1961 INs. L.J. 20, 21.
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